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Abstract 
Cross-cultural psychology, in both its culture-comparative and its cultural traditions, has been a 
highly successful enterprise; it has been instrumental in establishing context variation as an essential 
factor in the study of behavior and has led to a large volume of publications with culture as a key term. At 
the same time, the question arises whether the further accumulation of findings of often small differences 
between groups will continue to be a worthwhile pursuit, or whether it is time for a reorientation. Here two 
widespread assumptions of research on behavior and culture are discussed that are likely to be 
unsustainable: (i) a focus on cross-cultural differences at the cost of cultural invariance, (ii) the presumed 
psychological coherence of cultures, especially national cultures, reflected in major dimensions of 
differences in psychological functioning. It is argued that also emerging methods in cultural 
neuropsychology continue to place too much emphasis on cross-cultural differences and cultural 
coherence. With a view to reorientation two ideas are explored: (i) culture-comparative research needs 
an explicit focus on what humans as a species have in common (psychological invariance) and (ii) 
explanatory frameworks should have a better theoretical foundation. Research traditions in biology are 
mentioned that can provide a source of inspiration to researchers in cross-cultural psychology. One such 
tradition is classical ethology as outlined by Tinbergen (1963) who proposed that in the analysis of 
behavior patterns researchers should be asking multiple questions about the immediate context (cause), 
function, ontogenetic development and phylogenetic history.   
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Resumen  
La psicología transcultural, tanto en comparación cultural como en tradiciones culturales, ha 
sido una empresa exitosa; ha sido instrumental en el establecimiento de variaciones contextuales como 
un factor esencial en el estudio de la conducta y ha llevado a la publicación de un gran volumen de 
textos con la cultura como un término clave. Al mismo tiempo, la pregunta se plantea sobre si la futura 
acumulación de pequeños hallazgos sobre mínimas diferencias entre grupos continuará siendo una 
inversión valiosa, o si es tiempo de reorientar los esfuerzos. Aquí se discuten dos suposiciones robustas 
acerca de la investigación sobre conducta y cultura que se cree que ya no son sustentables: (1) Un 
enfoque sobre las diferencias transculturales a costa de invarianza cultural, (2) la supuesta coherencia 
psicológica de las culturas, especialmente culturas nacionales, reflejadas en mayores dimensiones de 
diferencias en funcionamiento psicológico. Se discute también que métodos emergentes en 
neuropsicología cultural siguen dando mucho énfasis en diferencias transculturales y coherencia 
cultural. Con un enfoque hacia la reorientación se exploran dos ideas: (1) La investigación comparativa 
cultural necesita un enfoque explícito sobre lo que los humanos como especie tienen en común 
(invarianza cultural), y (2) Marcos conceptuales explicativos deberían tener mejor fundamento teórico. 
Se menciona que las tradiciones de investigación en biología pueden proveer una fuente de inspiración 
para los investigadores de psicología transcultural. Una detales tradiciones es la etología clásica tal 
como la delinea Tinbergen (1963), quien propuso que en el análisis de patrones de conducta los 
investigadores deberían hacerse múltiples preguntas sobre el contexto inmediato (causa), la función, el 
desarrollo ontogenético y la historia filogenética.  
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Cross-cultural psychology as a recognized field of research started 
somewhere around the middle of the previous century. The first volume of the 
International Journal of Psychology with a clear cross-cultural flavor was published 
in 1966. The Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology was established in 1970. The 
founding conference of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology 
was held in 1972. Their success demonstrated that there was a sufficient number 
of researchers with a large enough volume of research to sustain these initiatives. 
A remarkable feature was the variety of researchers who became involved, both in 
terms of the region of the world where they worked and their research interests. 
Although the largest contingent of these early cross-cultural psychologists came 
from North America, other regions were represented, not only Europe but also 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Of the countries where psychology was already 
well established at the time only Russia and the other communist countries did not 
get involved, and this was for political reasons. These early cross-cultural 
psychologists investigated a range of topics. There was research in perception with 
susceptibility to visual illusions and the perception of depth in photographs and 
drawings (Deregowski, 1980, 1989; Segall, Campbell & Herskovits, 1966). In the 
broad area of cognition there was research on topics such as the structure of 
intelligence (Vernon, 1969), cognitive styles (Witkin & Berry, 1975) and the cultural-
historical activity tradition of Cole (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971) building on 
Vygotsky and Luria. Osgood conducted a large scale project in 30 countries that 
led to the Atlas of Affective Meaning (Osgood, May & Miron, 1975). Diaz-Guerrero 
(1969, 1990) developed the notion of historic sociocultural premises, such as 
machismo in Mexico, to reflect characteristic themes of a culture. Part of the 
research was driven by practical concerns, such as the construction of selection 
methods that could be used with a poorly educated workforce (Biesheuvel, 1954) 
and the transfer of clinical diagnostic categories including methods of assessment 
(Marsella & White, 1982). In terms of major fields of mainstream psychology social 
psychology was overrepresented and developmental psychology 
underrepresented, despite considerable attention for Piagetian research (Dasen, 
1972). An extensive overview of the early topics and issues can be found in the 
Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Triandis, 1980). A perhaps more 
objective indicator of the success is the rate of increase in publications that since 
1970 has been two times larger for cross-cultural psychology than for psychology 
in general (Van de Vijver, 2013).  
Since 1980 there have been shifts in topics of interest with cross-cultural 
research in perception going down and other fields gaining more attention. The 
most important of these shifts has been the growing attention for major value 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1980, Triandis, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). There 
have also been basic changes in orientation that in many respects qualify as a 
paradigm shift. This is reflected in two complementary developments: (i) the growth 
of indigenous psychologies (Sinha, 1997) and (ii) the emergence of cultural 
psychology (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007). Both these movements placed culture 
inside rather than outside the person, emphasizing cultural construction of the 
world through meanings and beliefs. With some simplification it may be said that 
traditional culture-comparative research conceived of culture as a set of 
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antecedent conditions that had consequences for behavior outcomes. If some 
difference was observed between two groups there should be an antecedent 
variable that can account for this. The presumption of invariant antecedent-
consequent relationships across all cultures was reflected in the notion of a psychic 
unity of humankind. In the indigenous and cultural approaches the initial position 
was that of essential psychic diversity across cultures (Shweder, 1990). In the 
1990s the controversy between universalism and cultural specificity dominated 
much of the theoretical and methodological discussion. Although old controversies 
are still lingering on, there appears to be a development towards a mainstream 
cross-cultural psychology that is largely culture-comparative and accepts a wide 
range of methods (Matsumoto & Van de Vijver, 2011).  
 
Emphasis on differences 
Throughout the various traditions of research in the past decades there is 
one theme that stands out: emphasis on differences between cultural populations. 
Even cross-cultural researchers who start from presumptions of universality by and 
large have been conducting research aimed at exploring and explaining 
differences. Since the days of Tylor (1871/1958) the concept of culture in cultural 
anthropology has been closely linked to the behavior repertoire of a human 
population and how this differs from the repertoire of other populations (Rapport & 
Overing, 2000). Cross-cultural psychology has adopted this tradition and continued 
to expand it. Here I argue that this emphasis is likely to lead to a distorted view of 
the extent to which humans function differently. In so far as this viewpoint is 
correct, cross-cultural psychology as an enterprise is in danger of presenting a 
stereotyped view of “others”. Four points are mentioned to support this allegation. 
(i) Design and interpretation of cross-cultural research. Perhaps the clearest 
illustration of distortion comes from a study by Brouwers, Van Hemert, 
Breugelmans, and Van de Vijver (2004) who analyzed a set of articles from the 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology and found that much more often differences 
were postulated and invariance (i.e., absence of significant differences) found than 
the reverse. In 69% of empirical studies only expected differences were 
formulated, while in 71% (rather than 29%!) of these studies similarities as well as 
differences were observed. In addition, there are sample fluctuations (Fontaine, 
Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008), and flexibility in data collection, analysis 
and reporting. All of these contribute to making the likelihood of a false positive 
result dramatically higher than the confidence level (usually p =.05) at which a 
finding is taken to be significant in 0-hypothesis testing (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011). The need for replication before accepting results recently 
advocated for social psychology applies equally to cross-cultural psychology.  
(ii) Cultural bias. Data in culture-comparative research tend to suffer from a 
lack of equivalence resulting in cultural bias (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). This 
can occur at the level of concepts (construct inequivalence), at the level of 
instruments (method inequivalence) and at the level of items (item bias or 
Differential Item Functioning). Inequivalence will lead to misrepresentation of cross-
cultural differences, a point strongly argued by indigenous psychologists who 
consider definitions of concepts and their operationalization in instruments as 
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inherently culture-bound. On the one hand, inequivalence can lead to 
underestimation of group differences in target constructs; raters who are less 
familiar with other contexts may use their own group as the standard for their 
judgments, a phenomenon known as the reference group effect (Heine, Lehmann, 
Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; van de gaer, Grisay, Schulz, & Gebhardt, 2012). As a 
consequenceresult the mean scores of various groups may end up being closer 
together than they should be. On the other hand, most sources of inequivalence 
will result in overestimation of the size of differences on target constructs (e.g., Van 
de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Van Hemert, Poortinga, & Van de Vijver, 2007). A variety 
of such sources have been identified, including effects of response styles and 
social desirability at the level of instruments and item bias due to inadequate 
translation at the level of separate items. Of course, bias effects represent true 
cross-cultural variance rather than measurement error, but differences in the 
intended target variables are misrepresented distorting our interpretations.  
(iii) Importance of differences. Cohen (1994, p. 1001) has warned against 
taking significant effects to be important effects: 
“a finding reported in the Results section studded with asterisks implicitly 
becomes in the Discussion section highly significant or very highly significant, 
important, big”.  
In core areas of cross-cultural research differences between cultures are 
small compared to differences between individuals nested within cultures. For 
example, in a large data set the between-country variance in the Schwartz Value 
Scale is approximately 12% of the total variance (Fischer & Schwartz, 2012). 
Although this is non-negligible variation that varies systematically across value 
items and countries, the percentage is much lower than even experts anticipate 
(Fischer, 2013). Similarly, the percentage of between-country variance for the Big 
Five dimensions in the FFM model of personality is in the order of 11% for self-
ratings and even less for ratings by others (McCrae et al., 2005a, b). This is neither 
to suggest that small differences cannot be important, nor that all differences in 
psychologically relevant variables are small (see below). However, the importance 
of cultural variation cannot be derived from statistical significance only. 
(iv) Convergent search for supporting evidence.  Major distinctions between 
countries such as Individualism-Collectivism and Independent versus 
Interdependent Construal of the Self frequently serve in one and the same study as 
the independent variable on the basis of which cultures (i.e., countries) are 
selected and as the explanatory variable or mediating variable in the interpretation 
of findings. Any intergroup difference found with such a design is seen as further 
evidence for the initial distinction. Needless to say that there is a need for research 
seeking discriminant validity. The failure to consider alternative explanations has 
led in the past to an exaggeration of the role of climate and later racial factors in 
the assessment of IQ (Berry et al., 2011). Cross-cultural psychologists should heed 
the lessons that can be learned from the past. 
In summary, research in cross-cultural psychology appears to be biased 
towards the detection of group differences. If this opinion has merit, the field needs 
a reorientation in which the balance between cultural invariance and variations is 
redefined. I will return to this in the final section. 
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Presumptions of cultural coherence 
There is an explicit or implicit assumption held by many authors to the effect 
that various aspects of behavior in cultural context should be interrelated. Cultures 
are supposed to show coherence and this has consequences for the way in which 
data about cross-cultural differences are being interpreted. A striking example from 
the literature may illustrate the issue. Shweder (1984, see also Poortinga & Van 
Hemert, 2001) reports a discussion at a conference in the course of which it was 
suggested that cultural integration is perhaps more present in ethnographies than 
in the cultures described. There was a strong reaction by the famous cultural 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz who argued that culture is neither like a heap of 
loose sand nor like a highly structured spider's web, but is  
"more like an octopus, a badly integrated creature—what passes for a brain 
keeps it together, more or less, in one ungainly whole" (p. 19).  
Of course, the octopus is a highly organized organism with interconnected 
limbs and organs and a central nervous system, and this is how most cultural 
anthropologists, and also many psychologists, think about a society's culture. This 
idea is reflected in the notion of a culture-as-a-system (e.g., a system of meanings, 
or a system of values) and also in notions such as “mentality” (Fiske, Kitayama, 
Markkus, & Nisbett, 1998) and “habitus” (lasting, acquired schemes of perception, 
thought and action, Bourdieu, 1998). In culture-comparative research the notion of 
a system is only useful if there is a set of common parameters to decide what 
belongs where in a given system. Otherwise the system notion becomes vague 
and gratuitous (e.g., everything what you find in America has to be part of 
American culture).  
While a system potentially covers each and every aspect of behavior, in 
cross-cultural psychology most comparisons between cultures are in terms of 
variables. Most popular are broad and inclusive dimensions, such as individualism-
collectivism, which Triandis (1996) referred to as a “syndrome”. Like a psychiatric 
syndrome is characterized by a variety of symptoms, individualism-collectivism 
appears in the behavior repertoire in many ways. It is difficult if not impossible to 
formulate constraints (i.e., which psychological variables are not influenced by this 
syndrome?). There is an increasing number of broad sociocultural dimensions 
(e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Minkov, 2008; Gelfand, 2012), each of which creates a 
simplified picture of cross-cultural differences (Medin, Unsworth and Hirschfeld, 
2007) and is poorly demarcated from dimensions formulated by other authors. 
Salient is the virtual absence of research that can lead to the possible rejection of 
such dimensions as valid and useful ways to distinguish between cultures. 
This criticism also applies to a new research tradition in cultural psychology, 
namely cultural neuroscience (Chiao & Ambady, 2007; Han, Northoff, Vogeley, 
Wexler, & Kitayama, 2013). This school seeks to relate cross-cultural differences, 
especially between individualist and collectivist societies, to differences in 
neurotransmitters and electrophysiological indicators. Research on 
neurotransmitters explores the behavioral consequences of variations in the 
distributions of allele frequencies across populations as defined in classical 
anthropology. Some such polymorphisms have been studied in a fairly large 
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number of populations (see http://alfred.med.yale.edu).  An example with 
substantial intergroup variation is the dopamine receptor gene D4. Individual 
variations have been associated with neuropsychiatric disorders and with a variety 
of differences in cognition and emotion. However, precise links with overt behavior 
remain rather unclear. This is not surprising as the excretion and metabolism of 
neurotransmitters and their effects in the brain are highly varied and complex. This 
is well illustrated by the Wikipedia site on dopamine 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dopamine). Although it is highly likely that at least 
some of the genetic population differences are at the basis of cross-cultural 
differences in behavior, findings to such effect so far are not more than mere 
suggestions and much more research will be needed to establish in how far 
cultures reflect group diversity in genetic constitution.  
Exciting research has been conducted with fMRI (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging), a method for measuring changes in blood flow across the 
brain. Numerous comparative studies have been conducted mainly with samples of 
students in the USA of European descent and of East Asian descent. Differences 
across this cultural dichotomy have been pursued with weak designs and post hoc 
interpretation. Unfortunately, fMRI studies are extremely vulnerable to false 
positive results or Type II errors (i.e., statistically significant are found that do not 
exist in the population).  Costs of data recording and analysis and the consequent 
limited sample sizes lead to a high probability of such errors. This probability is 
enhanced dramatically by the fact that fine-grained distinctions are made with 
many voxels (volume elements) in the brain. Vul, Harris, Winkelman, & Pashler 
(2009) have demonstrated how this leads to unreliable outcomes. With no a priori 
defined neurological pathways for individualism and collectivism the interpretation 
of ad hoc patterns of differences can hardly be more than tentative. 
Dimensions and traits that are somewhat more narrowly defined, like 
personality dimensions, are more open to critical analysis. For example, the Big 
Five dimensions for the cultural invariance of which wide support was found 
(McCrae et al., 2005a, b) have been shown not to provide an optimal 
representation of the structure of personality in China (Cheung et al., 2001) and 
South Africa (Valchev, van de Vijver, Nel, Rothmann, & Meiring, 2013). In both 
cases the social side of individual personality was found to be underrepresented. 
Definite answers about dimensions of personality structure may still be pending, 
but extant structures have been questioned on the basis of empirical data that did 
not show expected fit. Apparently, structures like the Big Five can be challenged.  
The kinds of interpretations discussed so far are mainly about stable 
psychological characteristics of a person that are found more often within a given 
culture than in other cultures. Interpretations can also be about domains or fields of 
behavior that are organized in terms of skills or knowledge of procedures (Cole, 
1996). Berry et al. (2011) argue that behavior domains are more descriptive and 
less inferential than traits. Interpretations can be formulated in terms of broad 
domains, such as literacy which is composed of a large set of skills and 
procedures, or in terms of small domains. The latter include all kinds of cultural 
customs, practices and conventions. These are mainly descriptive terms that stay 
close to direct observation of daily life in a particular society. The term convention 
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is attractive as it denotes an agreement among members of a group not only about 
how to do things, but also about what to believe, what to value, etc (Berry et al., 
2011; Girndt, 2000).  
In the history of cross-cultural psychology research on new topics or themes 
tends to be launched with initial claims of “big and broad” differences in 
psychological functions and processes. With more precise empirical inquiry such 
inclusive generalizations usually cannot be upheld. Presumed coherence of 
cultures and of cross-cultural differences are problematic (e.g., Chiu & Chiao, 
2009; Poortinga, 2003). In general, interpretations of cross-cultural differences that 
are less comprehensive tend to allow more critical empirical scrutiny and they stay 
closer to the actual data. The notion of cultural conventions has been described 
here in some detail as it provides a starting point for cross-cultural analysis without 
implicit assumptions of cultural coherence. More inclusive interpretations are not 
ruled out; they are attractive because they are more parsimonious (they explain 
more cultural variance in more variables) and they fit the everyday impression that 
various aspects of the behavior repertoire are integrated. The point is that causal 
evidence is needed before coherence of patterns of cross-cultural differences can 
be accepted. Correlations between variables do not provide strong enough 
evidence as they are open to multiple interpretations. All in all, a kind of bottom-up 
analysis starting from domain oriented notions, such as conventions may provide 
an alternative starting point for research on behavior and culture. 
 
 
Cross-cultural differences as variations on common themes 
As a rule cultural differences are the focus of analysis in cross-cultural 
psychology; the unity of humankind is only formally recognized. In contrast, such a 
unity is the explicit starting point in biological approaches where diversity is a 
derivative of what is common. Contemporary biologists recognize that through 
evolution development has followed a road with many curves and detours and that 
the translation of genes into behavior is a complicated process of interactions 
between organism and environment. Biologists like Gould and Lewontin (1991; 
Gould, 1979) have started to conceptualize such complexities, pointing to multiple 
expressions of a single gene (“pleiotropy”), enabling functions beyond those that 
led to its development originally (spandrels”), and features that now enhance the 
adaptedness of human to their environment in a different way as in phylogenetic 
history (“exaptations”). There is much discussion about such concepts and their 
reach, but any sharp contrast between “nature” and “nurture”, is clearly outdated. 
Unfortunately, various traditions in the study of behavior and human diversity 
rooted in evolutionary theory are rarely cited in the cross-cultural literature, 
although their relevance for our concerns is evident (Keller, Poortinga, & 
Schölmerich, 2002). 
Brown, Dickins, Sear, and Laland (2011) have provided a brief overview of 
three research fields that span biology and anthropology. Human behavioral 
ecology studies variation in behavior as reflecting adaptive responses to the 
environment. It is a core assumption that the individual is aiming at enhancing 
reproductive fitness, but the models in this field tend to be neutral on the traditional 
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contrast of genetic versus social-environmental. One topic of research is on 
patterns of care giving to infants and how these differ for industrialized societies, 
agricultural societies and hunter-gatherers, and even between various hunter-
gatherer groups (Hewlett & Lamb, 2002; Konner, 2005). 
Evolutionary psychology (following the earlier school of sociobiology) is 
postulating specialized psychological mechanisms that are genetic and have 
evolved in response to selection pressures; the early theorizing tended to be rather 
deterministic with environmental variation as the almost exclusive force behind 
behavioral diversity (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Empirical research illustrating 
how an evolutionary orientation will lead to new insights has been reported by 
Chasiotis and colleagues (Bender & Chasiotis, 2012; Chasiotis, Bender & Hofer, 
2013). Considering developmental stages as evolutionary end products that are 
preparations for adulthood, they found that the number of siblings is a crucial 
variable in explaining cultural variance in autobiographical memory and implicit 
parental motivation; variance previously attributed to sociocultural dimensions. 
Cultural evolution is analyzing how cultural practices change over time and 
how these changes that influence gene-culture co-evolution can be modeled (Boyd 
& Richerson, 2005; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). Examples of such co-
evolution are a relatively high rate of red-green color blindness in groups that gave 
up hunting and gathering a long time ago and the development of lactose tolerance 
in populations of herders in colder regions of the world where milk is needed to 
compensate for low rates of ultraviolet light needed for the production of Vitamin D 
(see Berry et al., 2011 for more on these examples).   
Another biological tradition that can offer inspiration for cross-cultural 
psychology is classical ethology as established by Lorenz (1965) and Tinbergen 
(1963). They studied patterns of behavior with systematic observation in field 
conditions as the main method. Although more time consuming than surveys and 
questionnaires, this is a method available to students of human behavior. The 
reason this tradition is being mentioned here is that multiple questions are being 
asked in the study of a behavior pattern. In a foundational article Tinbergen (1963) 
postulated four such questions: cause, function, ontogenetic development and 
phylogenetic development of a behavior pattern.  
The question of causation is asking which external factors in the 
environment and internal factors in the organism (e.g., hormonal excretions) lead 
to a behavior pattern to happen. The question of function is about how the 
observed pattern contributes to survival (what is it good for?); analysis begins with 
extensive observations on how the pattern makes sense in terms of survival value. 
The question of ontogenetic development seeks to understand changes in the 
behavior machinery over time. According to Tinbergen the innate and what is being 
learned are intercalated, with environmental effects often being additive to 
machinery that is functional already. The fourth and final question is asking about 
the evolution or phylogenetic development of a behavior pattern; the reconstruction 
of such changes generally requires comparative analysis between species.   
For cross-cultural psychology an approach as outlined by Tinbergen (1963) 
looks promising, since it requires simultaneous analysis of a behavior pattern from 
multiple perspectives (Poortinga, 2011). This comes with an increase in 
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complexity, but also in the quality of interpretation. Ethology, like the other schools 
mentioned in this section, starts from the explicit recognition that humans are a 
single species, assuming common themes underneath local variations. The most 
relevant set of questions in cross-cultural psychology may partly differ from 
ethology; notably of interest is the question of development of behavior patterns in 
historical time. If anything, this question strengthens further the principle that 
answers to multiple questions are likely to enhance the quality of interpretation. 
It should be recognized that Tinbergen’s four questions have been criticized 
because there is overlap between them and his views on evolution may be 
somewhat outdated. Still, much of Tinbergen’s legacy is being upheld today also in 
biological research with non-human species (e.g., Bolhuis & Verhulst, 2009; 
Bolhuis & Wynne, 2009) where the neurological and physiological machinery of a 
behavior pattern is more directly accessible and drastic experimental manipulation 
of the environment is deemed ethically permissible. While in some respects more 
limited in the range of available methods, psychology has the advantage that 
humans can produce self-reports and reports about past events. Perhaps the most 
serious difficulty for psychology is the definition of one behavior pattern in 
distinction of other patterns; in research with non-human species salient patterns 
with a sequence of steps, like food gathering or courtship behavior and mating, are 
identified and distinguished more easily from other patterns than in humans.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Cross-cultural psychology is a dynamic field, continually reflecting on past 
research and raising further questions (Van de Vijver, Chasiotis, & Breugelmans, 
2011). This overview is meant to contribute to such reflection. Usually the primary 
focus of cross-cultural psychology is on differences in behavior across cultures. It 
can be argued that traditions have grown where some difference is treated as a 
given and used to interpret other differences. To avoid the danger of over-
interpretation it is advocated here that the explicit starting point of research on 
culture and behavior should be based in cross-cultural invariance or how human 
psychological functioning is similar across cultures. Human beings can be said to 
possess a disposition, or set of dispositions, enabling the construction of an 
elaborate and complex niches with important local variations that we tend to call 
cultures. Much of the intellectual ancestry of cross-cultural psychology is based in 
cultural anthropology. Perhaps it is time to look for more balance between 
biological and anthropological viewpoints on human nature and human culture. 
Cross-cultural psychologists can contribute uniquely to help create such a balance.   
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